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Abstract
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pool resource game: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-
transferable quotas. Theory predicts that they all reduce resource use from free access
to the same target level without hurting users. We find that all regulations perform
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1 Introduction
The “tragedy of the commons” highlighted by Hardin (1968) is a major problem in so-
cieties. It refers to the overuse of common-pool resources (CPR) extracted under open
access. Examples include natural resources such as fisheries, forests, water or oil. It also
refers to environmental resources, such as clean air since excessive pollution leads to envi-
ronmental damages, biodiversity loss or global warming. The market economy is inefficient
in exploiting CPR because property rights on resources such as water or clean air are
difficult to assign and to enforce (Demsetz, 1967).
A solution to mitigate the market failure associated with the tragedy of the commons is
regulation. Various regulatory instruments can reduce CPR overuse. One consists in taxing
resource extraction or pollution and, possibly, using the money collected to subsidize less
resource-intensive or cleaner technologies, or to retrain resource users in other economic
activities. Another widespread regulation consists in setting upper bounds on resource
extraction or polluting emissions, in the form of rationing rules and emission norms, or
extraction/emission quotas which can be exchanged in a market.
The three aforementioned instruments (taxes and subsidies, transferable quotas and
non-transferable quotas) are observed worldwide, sometimes to regulate the same resource
or environmental problem. For instance, Iceland and New Zealand issue individual har-
vesting quotas on their fisheries, and allow fishermen to trade quotas. The United States
has opted for boat buy-backs financed by landing fees to reduce the stress on crab fisheries
in the Bering Sea (Hannesson, 2004). Governments implement various environmental poli-
cies to reduce air pollution such as CO2 emissions that cause global warming. European
countries tend to tax fossil fuel heavily , and to subsidize energy produced from renewable
resources (e.g. wind and solar energy). The European Union has issued CO2 emission
quotas for major emitters, and launched the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in which those
emission rights are traded. The United States imposed SO2 emission norms on coal power
plants before moving to tradable quotas (Burtraw 2000). Water provides a third example of
regulation diversity to remedy the tragedy of the commons. Water extraction is sometimes
taxed to finance the maintenance or improvement of irrigation ditches. In case of drought,
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water is often rationed through individual consumption limitations. In some places (e.g.
Southern Spain) water markets have existed for centuries (Ostrom, 1990).
The diversity of regulations implemented in practice to tackle the same CPR problem
suggests that the choice of instrument does not stand to reason. This article aims at
helping policy-makers to make this choice by comparing CPR regulations theoretically
and experimentally. Each regulation provides specific incentives to CPR users, thereby
affecting their behavior and welfare. It determines the rule of the “CPR game” they play.
The success of a new regulation depends on its perception by users.
We focus on three regulations: an access fee and subsidy scheme (FS), transferable
individual quotas (TQ) and non-transferable individual quotas (NTQ). We compute a
CPR game in which the three instruments lead to the same reduction of CPR extraction
in the Nash equilibrium. The two market-based instruments FS and TQ are, in theory,
equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same individual extraction choices and payoffs
in equilibrium. They are more efficient than NTQ because they minimize the aggregate
extraction costs by sorting out the most efficient users, i.e. those with lower extraction
or pollution abatement costs, from the less efficient ones. Lastly, all regulations lead to
a Pareto improvement from fee access in equilibrium. These theoretical predictions are
tested experimentally.
Most of the experimental literature on the “commons” investigates coordination in un-
regulated CPR games with communication among players and/or with monitoring and
sanctioning tools (see Ostrom 2006 for a review). The focus is on the endogenous emer-
gence of self-regulation rules. In Walker et al. (2000), commoners vote over extraction
rules. In some papers (e.g. Casari and Plott, 2003), these rules are enforced through
a peer-monitoring and a punishment process. Several papers (Herr et al., 1997, Mason
and Phillips, 1997, Oses-Eraso et al., 2006) investigate the inter-temporal dimension of
common-pool resources without regulation that extend the CPR game to encompass dy-
namic externalities. Other papers evaluate a specific regulation that aims to reduce resource
extraction or environmental pollution. Cason and Plott (1996) experimentally evaluate a
new auction scheme to trade sulfur dioxide emission rights implemented in the nineties in
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the United States. Schott et al. (2006) likewise conducted an experiment inspired by catch-
pooling practices in Japan where fishermen share their harvest equally within subgroups of
different sizes. In a non-point source pollution framework, Cochard et al. (2005) tested the
efficiency of ambient taxes, and Cason et al. (2003) experimentally evaluated an auction
mechanism to reduce emissions. In a similar framework, Giordana and Willinger (2007)
compare three tax policies: a flat tax, an ambient tax and mixed tax. The aim of these
papers is to asses how subjects deal with the complexity of regulations which entail en-
dogenous tax rates or prices. Another paper that examines several regulations applied to a
pollution problem is Johnson, Rutstro¨mb and George (2006). Subjects play an unregulated
“social dilemma” game (resembling a CPR game) which is then regulated through emission
permits. They choose one of the following two assignment policies: grandfathering (i.e.
permits assigned proportionally on emissions in the unregulated game) and egalitarian.
The focus is on eliciting social preferences for regulations and not on their evaluation.
When designing our experimental protocol, we kept our focus on the assessment of the
three regulatory instruments in relation to the following criteria: resource preservation, in-
dividual profits (and Pareto improvement from free access), and sorting effect (self-selection
of the more efficient users). Our design therefore differs from the aforementioned experi-
ments in four main respects. First, subjects sequentially play the common pool resource
game under free access (FA) and under the regulatory regimes FS, TQ and NTQ. Each par-
ticipant takes part in those four treatments. The within-study generates sharper statistical
inferences because, as a single subject is observed in several conditions, it automatically
controls for individual differences (Camerer 2003, Friedman 1994). This procedure is there-
fore perfectly suitable for our comparison of the different institutions under consideration.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that tests the three regulations in a sin-
gle experiment. Second, we were willing to facilitate the beliefs on aggregate effort as
we were interested in testing the sole effect of the regulatory policies and not the level of
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information1. That is why each participant remains in the same group2 and is provided
with complete information. We did not allow commoners to communicate or coordinate
their strategy since we wanted to elicit their non-cooperative behavior. Third, we opted
for exogenous and fully enforced rules. The idea is that an external regulator (e.g. public
authority) imposes rules in order to correct overexploitation in a CPR. Therefore, the reg-
ulator decides on the level of extraction in NTQ, the number and the price of the permits
in TQ and the level of subsidy/tax in FS. Finally, we kept our framework as simple as
possible by using a static analysis in order to focus on a short-term impact of regulations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game and the design of
the experiment. Section 3 analyses with the mains results of the experiments. Section 4
concludes the paper with further discussion.
2 Game and experiment
2.1 A common-pool resource game with heterogenous players
A group of n individuals are endowed with x¯ production units which can be invested in two
markets or production processes. The first market is the common-pool resource (CPR). Its
return depends on the total amount invested by all subjects, denoted as X and referred to
as “CPR extraction”. The per unit benefit of investing in the CPR is φ(X) = a− bX with
a > 0 and b > 0, which is the average product.3 The second market is the outside option
which yields a fixed return which can be cA or cB with 0 < cA < cB < a. An individual’s
1Apesteguia (2006) studied behavioral consequences of two degrees of information on CPR (complete
vs. incomplete information) and found that information does not alter behaviors, i.e. both levels of
information lead to the convergence of the aggregate effort towards the Nash equilibrium.
2This repeated “Partners” design may allow participants to build a reputation in FA. However, such
strategic behaviors can easily be detected in the last period when the reputation no longer matters. Besides,
with two groups per session, we double the number of independent observations compared to a “Strangers”
design.
3A special feature of CPRs is that by investing x units of extracting effort, an individual obtains a
share xX of total extraction (or harvest) Xφ(X). The linear form a− bX is standard in CPR experiments
(Janssen and Ostrom, 2006).
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rate of return on the second market can be seen as her or his opportunity cost of extracting
the resource. It is referred to as his or her “type” which can be low (for A) or high (for B).
Assume that among the n agents, a share α is of type A while the others are of type B.
In this set-up, we successively consider four investment regimes: the free-access regime
and three regulated regimes. Each regime defines a specific investment game. Under the
free-access regime (FA), individuals are free to invest their endowment in the two markets
without restrictions. Under individual and non-transferable quotas (NTQ), investment in
the CPR is bounded to a quota xˆ < x¯. Under individual and transferable quotas (TQ),
individuals endowed with xˆ units of quotas on the CPR can buy or sell those quotas at a
fixed price p. Under the fee and subsidy scheme (FS), they must pay an access fee of τ for
the first unit invest in the CPR and can receive a subsidy σ if they do not invest in the
CPR.
We first focus on the free-access regime. Under FA, the profit of an individual of type
i = A,B who invests xi units in the CPR and x¯− xi in the outside option is:
pii(xi, X) = xiφ(X) + ci(x¯− xi). (1)
In the Nash equilibrium of the FA game, each individual maximizes her or his investment
strategy xi given the investment strategies played by the other players X − xi. A player
of type i maximizes pii(xi, X) subject to the capacity constraint xi ≤ x¯ and the non-
negativity constraint xi ≤ 0.4 An interior solution 0 < xi < x¯ satisfies the following first
order condition:
φ(X) + φ′(X)xi = ci. (2)
The player of type i equalizes the marginal benefit investing in the CPR (left-hand side)
with her or his marginal opportunity cost ci (right-hand side). If marginal benefit is strictly
higher than ci then xi = x¯. If it is strictly lower then xi = 0.
Since φ(X) = a − bX, the above first-order condition becomes a − bX − bxi = ci for
4By labeling agents by they type, we implicitly assume that players of same type play the same strategy.
We therefore focus on symmetric Nash equilibria.
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any i = A,B, which yields the following best strategy play by i for any CPR extraction X
xi =

0 if a− ci
b
−X ≤ 0
a− ci
b
−X if 0 ≤ a− ci
b
−X ≤ x¯
x¯ if a− ci
b
−X ≥ x¯
(3)
Player i’s investment in the CPR is decreasing with CPR extraction at a rate which depends
on his opportunity cost ci. For a given X, type A players, whose opportunity cost of
investment in the CPR is lower, tend to invest more in the CPR than type B ones.
Summing up conditions (3) for i = A,B yields the Nash equilibrium investment level
in the CPR in an interior solution 0 < xi < x¯ for both player types,
XFA =
n
(n+ 1)b
(a− αcA − (1− α)cB). (4)
If the above CPR extraction is higher than full investment capacity nx¯, then the FA
regime leads to a corner solution whereby all players invest their full capacity in the CPR,
i.e. xFAi = x¯ for i = A,B. The equilibrium extraction level is then X
FA = nx¯. If
a− cB
b
− XFA is negative (with XFA defined in (4)) then only type A players invest in
the CPR. In an interior solution where both types invest in the CPR, type i’s investment
strategy is xFAi =
a− cA
b
−XFA for i = A,B with XFA defined by (4).
We now turn to the three regulatory regimes NTQ, TQ and FS. The aim of those
regulations is to reduce CPR extraction to a target X < XFA. Each regulation defines a
game which provides specific incentives to players. We analyze how those regulations affect
player’s behavior and derive the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Under non-transferable quotas NTQ, investment in the CPR is bounded by the same
quota xˆ with 0 < xˆ < x¯ assigned to each of the n players. Therefore total investment
in the CPR cannot exceed nxˆ. The return per investment on the CPR is at least φ(nxˆ).
Since φ(nxˆ) > φ(XFA) ≥ ci for i = A,B and φ is decreasing in X, the return on the
CPR is always higher than the return on the outside option ci for all players i for any
X ≤ nxˆ. Therefore a dominant strategy for all player types is to invest all the quotas xˆ
in the CPR. In other words, quotas are “binding”. To sum-up, setting quotas to xˆ such
that nxˆ < XFA implements a target extraction X = nxˆ with both types investing all their
investment quotas xˆ in the CPR.
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Under transferable quotas TQ, players are allowed to exchange their xˆ investment
quotas at an equilibrium price p. Players are price takers since p is exogenously fixed in
the experiment. Since quotas are binding, the quota equilibrium price is strictly positive.
As with NTQ, all quotas are exhausted and the Nash equilibrium CPR extraction is nxˆ.
The return from investing in the CPR is φ(nxˆ) in equilibrium. However the opportunity
cost now includes the quota price p since, to invest in the CPR, a player has to buy an
extra quota or to give up the benefit of selling it. In the equilibrium of the quota market,
those who buy quotas (if any) are the low-cost players A and those who sell are the high-
cost players B.5 By buying all type B players’ quotas, each type A player ends up with
nxˆ
nα =
xˆ
α quotas. Since xˆ < αx, each type A player can use all her or his quotas to invest
in the CPR. The price p of an equilibrium in which type A players buy and use all type B
players’ quotas must satisfy the following inequalities:
φ(nxˆ) ≥ p+ cA (5)
φ(nxˆ) ≤ p+ cB (6)
Each type A player buys quotas in the market if the return on a unit invested in the CPR
(left-hand side in (5)) is higher than her or his opportunity (right-hand side in (5)) which
now includes the price of quotas. Similarly, each type B player sells quotas if the return
of a unit invested in the CPR (left-hand side in (6)) is lower than her or his opportunity
(right-hand side in (6)). Conditions (5) and (6) imply φ(nxˆ)− cB ≤ p ≤ φ(nxˆ)− cA. Any
price p in the range φ(nxˆ) − cB to φ(nxˆ) − cA is an equilibrium price in the TQ regime
whereby only type A players invest in the CPR. It leads to an equilibrium in which gains
for trades in the quota market are fully exploited to minimize CPR exploitation costs and,
therefore, improve efficiency. In the experiment, we set the price exogenously in the middle
of the range φ(nxˆ)−cB to φ(nxˆ)−cA to favor this efficiency feature of quota transferability.
Under the fee and subsidy regime FS, players must pay an access fee τ > 0 for the first
unit invested in the CPR. Moreover, they recieve a subsidy σ if they do not invest any unit
in the CPR. Therefore the FS scheme affects a player’s marginal decision only for the first
5Heterogeneity in cost cA < cB ensures that there are prices p with exchanges, and thus buyers and
sellers in the quota market.
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unit: the opportunity cost of the first unit of investment is σ+ τ + ci for i = A,B. As with
TQ, the goal of the FS scheme is to reduce CPR extraction to X < XFA with minimized
costs by self-excluding high cost players B from the CPR and keeping all low-cost players
A investing all their endowment in the CPR in the Nash equilibrium. CPR extraction is
thus nαx¯ = X. A sufficient condition for an access fee τ and a subsidy σ to achieve this
goal in a Nash equilibrium is that they satisfy the two following two incentive-compatibility
constraints:
x¯φ(nαx¯)− τ > x¯cA + σ, (7)
x¯φ(nαx¯)− τ < x¯cB + σ. (8)
Condition (7) ensures that a type A player prefers to invest all her or his endowment in
the CPR, which yields the left-hand side benefit, rather than in the outside option which
results in the right-hand side payoff. The reverse condition (8) holds for player B.6 Due to
the lump-sum nature of (τ, σ), all other incentive compatibility constraints can be ignored,
at least in the experimental example computed below.7 The two conditions imply that
τ + σ must lie between x¯(φ(nαx¯) − cB) and x¯(φ(nαx¯) − cA). The FS scheme (τ, σ) must
be budget balanced in the sense that what is collected on the nα type A players τnα
must entirely finance the total subsidies (1−α)nσ granted to the (1−α)n type B players.
Therefore σ and τ must satisfy the following budget-balance constraint
(1− α)nσ ≤ τnα. (9)
To sum up, the three regulations succeed in reducing extraction from free access to the
same target level XR in the Nash equilibrium. Market-based instruments that are TQ and
FS exploit gains for trade to reduce costs by self-selecting only low cost A players in the
CPR.
6To be precise, if a type B player deviates from the Nash equilibrium by investing all her or his
endowment in the CPR, the payoff should be x¯φ(nαx¯+ x¯)− τ in (8). However, since φ is decreasing, (8)
is more stringent than x¯φ(nαx¯+ x¯)− τ < x¯cB + σ.
7By the other incentive-compatible constraints, we mean those that prevent any player from investing
only part of their endowment in the CPR rather than all (for types A) or nothing (for type B).
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Finally, we set the target X so that all regulations are Pareto improvement compared to
free access in the Nash equilibrium. This is what we call the “Pareto dominance condition”:
a regulation is Pareto dominant rational if everybody obtains a higher profit than under free
access. We design an experimental example in which all regulations are Pareto dominant
and implement the same target CPR extraction if the subjects play the Nash equilibrium.
2.2 An experimental example
The experiment is designed for n = 8 subjects, 4 of type A and 4 of type B. Therefore
α = 1− α = 1
2
. Subjects are endowed with x = 4 investment units so that maximal CPR
extraction is X = 4× 8 = 32.
We calibrate the parameters a and b of the average return φ and the highest opportunity
costs cB so that type B player’s marginal benefit from investing in the CPR described in
(2) is slightly higher than its marginal cost when everybody invest all their endowment in
the CPR. Formally, we set a = 230, b = 3 and cB = 120 so that φ(32) + φ
′(32) × 4 =
a − b × 32 − b × 4 = 122 ≥ cB = 120. The low opportunity cost is cA = 90, which
is different enough from cB to exploit gains for trade in the TQ regime and to design a
budget balance FS scheme that keeps only the type A players investing all their 4 units
in the Nash equilibrium.8 With the above parameters, for any X ≤ 32, the marginal
benefit of investing in the CPR φ(X) + φ′(X)xi is always higher than its marginal cost
ci ∈ {90, 120} for any xi ≤ 4.9 Therefore, it is not only a Nash equilibrium strategy but
also a dominant strategy for all players to invest all their endowment in the CPR under
8The strength of the social dilemma can also be measured by the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR).
MPCR is defined as the ratio of benefits to cost for reducing the extraction level by one unit. In our
setting, the MPCR is: MPCR = bx+bX+cia . It lies between 0 and 1 for a social dilemma with a maximal
temptation not to cooperate for values closer to 1. Our parametrization is in line with recent literature on
CPR (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). The range of MPCR in Janssen et.al. (2006) is between 0 and 0.97. In
our case the range of MPCR is smaller between 0.39 and 0.99 due to the aforementioned Pareto dominance
condition.
9Even with xB = 4 and if X = 32, the marginal benefit 122 is still slightly higher than type B’s
marginal cost.
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free access. The dominant strategies are thus xA = xB = x¯ = 4 for a total investment in
the CPR under free-access XFA = nx¯ = 32. The equilibrium profits are the same for both
types piA(4, 32) = piB(4, 32) = 536 as they do not invest in the market where their return
differ.
To be able to compare regulations, we fix the same target level implemented under the
Nash equilibrium of the three regulatory regimes X. In order to exploit gains for trade,
we set the quotas to xˆ = 2 so that if all the type B players sell all their quotas to the type
A players, each type A players will own 4 quota units which can be used to invest all her
or his 4 endowment units in the CPR. Therefore, we can end-up with only the low-cost A
players exploiting the CPR under full capacity. The target CPR extraction level is thus
X = nxˆ = 16.10
Under non-transferable quota NTQ, it is a dominant strategy for all players to use
their 2 quota units (half of their endowment) to invest in the CPR, the remaining 2 units
being automatically invested in the outside option. Since CPR extraction is nxˆ = 16 =,
the rate of return in the CPR is φ(16) = 182 which is obviously higher than the one
under free access φ(32) = 134. Payoffs are piA(2, 16) = 182 × 2 + 90 × 2 = 544 and
piB(2, 16) = 182 × 2 + 120 × 2 = 604. Both subjects improve their gain compared to FA
but those of type B more than those of type A since the return of their 2 units invested in
the outside option “market delta” is higher.
Under the transferable quotas regime TQ, to obtain a market equilibrium in which type
B players sell their 2 quotas to type A players (who therefore can invest their 4 endowment
units in the CPR), the price must lie between φ(nxˆ)− cB = 62 and φ(nxˆ)− cA = 92 (see
conditions (5) and (6)). We set the price in the middle of this range p = 77.11 The rate of
10We have chosen not to implement the first best CPR extraction level which is X = 12 investment
units because the “Pareto dominant condition” that imposes a Pareto improvement from free access in
the Nash equilibrium would be violated. Moreover, implementing X = 12 with uniform quotas, i.e. under
NTQ and TQ, would require one to assign 1.5 quota units to each subject and, therefore, to divide the
quotas.
11We have chosen not to endogenize the price to keep the experiment simple enough to be able to test all
the regimes within a 2-hours experiments. In particular, we do not examine the issue of the adjustment of
11
return in the CPR is φ(16) = 182. Payoffs are piA(4, 16)− 2p = 4× 182− 2× 77 = 574 and
piB(0, 16) + 2p = 4× 120 + 2× 77 = 634.
Under the FS regime, the fee τ and subsidy σ to provide with incentive for type A
players to invest all their units in the CPR and for type B players not to invest in the CPR
must satisfy the incentive-compatibility conditions (7) and (8). With our parameters, it
leads to x¯(φ(16)− cB) = 248 ≤ τ + σ ≤ 368 = x¯(φ(16)− cA). We pick τ + σ in the middle
of this range, i.e., τ + σ = 308. The budget balance constraint (9) simplifies to τ = σ.
Therefore τ = 154 = σ. This FS scheme implements X = 16 in the Nash equilibrium with
same profits and investments than under TQ.
To sum-up, the theoretical predictions of the Nash equilibrium (sometimes also in a
dominant strategy equilibrium) of the experimental example are:
1. The free-access leads to CPR over-extraction XFA = 32.
2. All instruments lead to a CPR extraction level X = 16 < XFA.
3. All regulations are Pareto improving in the sense that everybody obtains a higher
payoff than under free access.
4. Both FS and TQ perform equally in sorting the low-cost players since they keep only
low-cost players A investing in the CPR. As a consequence, payoffs are equal under
FS and TQ, and higher than under NTQ.
2.3 Experimental procedure
The experiment, entirely computerized, was conducted at the experimental laboratory of
the GAEL research center in Grenoble, France in May-June 2007. A total of 128 engineering
and social science students volunteered to participate in one of the 8 sessions. In order to
make the decisions non-hypothetical, the subjects were informed at the beginning of the
prices. As a consequence, we obtain some rationing in the quota market as some subject’s offer of a quota
or demand could not be satisfied at this price in the experiment. Therefore, even though the exogenous
equilibrium price helps subjects to exploit gains for trade, price rigidity penalizes them.
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session that at the end they would anonymously be paid an amount in cash depending
on their decisions and the decisions of others. Subjects earned 15 Euros minimum and
35 Euros maximum. The currency was the U during the experiment and the exchange
rate was 0.1661 Euro = 100U. A session lasted approximately 2 hours. Before the actual
experiment, the experimenter read the instructions aloud to the subjects. In addition,
they were able to read these instructions on their individual screen at their own pace. It
was made clear that the instructions were identical for all the participants. To control the
subjects’ understanding of the instructions, they were given a questionnaire. Its correction
took place with the experimenter before starting each treatment.
A session was composed of four treatments, each corresponding to one regulation: free
access (FA), individual non transferable quota (NTQ), individual transferable quota (TQ)
or the fee and subsidy scheme(FS). Each treatment was repeated 7 times. In each session,
subjects were randomly and anonymously matched in two groups of 8 players. The group
composition and the types of assignment (A and B) remained fixed throughout the session.
No interaction between the two groups was possible. Every subject was involved in the
four treatments sequentially. To test a possible order effect, the four treatments were
sorted differently in every session (8 sessions were conducted). In particular, we made
sure that each treatment was played twice in each position (see Appendix A in appendix).
Participants had complete information on their own and others payoffs. All the payoff
equations and parameters corresponded to the ones depicted in Section 2.2. In order to
avoid interferences with subjects’ green sensibility, we did not use any term relative to a
common pool resource or the environment. We rather mentioned two production markets:
one reproducing the CPR incentives (called gamma market) and one corresponding to an
outside market with a fixed return (called delta market). The subjects’task consisted in
investing their endowment in these two markets. In FA, each subject had to allocate 4 units
in the gamma and delta markets (see the protocol in the appendix for more details). The
same task was proposed in NTQ except that gamma market was restricted to two units.
In FS, subjects paid a fixed tax when allocating one or more units in the gamma market
or received a fixed subsidy when allocating nothing in the gamma market. As for TQ,
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subjects were endowed with two units and decided whether they wished to buy/sell one or
two units. Once bids and asks were allocated12, subjects made their allocation decision.
3 Results of the experiment
3.1 Learning and Order Effect
We first assess the subjects’ understanding of the game given the protocol. We deliberately
restricted the number of times each treatment was repeated to 7 to make sure that each
subject was able to play the four treatments within a reasonable length of time (about 2
hours). This within-study has the advantage of strengthening the statistical analysis as it
removes the sample effect. Nevertheless, it may have two drawbacks. One is that the way
subjects play a given treatment can be influenced by what happened during the previous
treatment(s) in which they took part. We control this by analyzing the order effect, i.e. we
test whether the position in which a treatment was played has an impact on the extraction
level. An overall Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the four positions (p = 0.4566) which indicates that the position in the
treatment sequence does not affect significantly investment strategies.
The second limit of the protocol is that it leaves very few periods for players to learn
the game defined by a treatment. To asses the length of the learning stage we evaluate
the convergence to a stable strategy overtime. More precisely, we consider the absolute
value of the deviation from the Nash strategy |xit− xNash| where xit is subject i’s strategy
at period t and xNash is the Nash strategy (for this type of subject and this treatment).
We asses how the above deviation could be explained by the periods, the treatment and
the type of player (A or B), all expressed as dummy variables. We therefore estimate the
following equation:
|xit−xNash| = c+
∑
t=2,...,T
αt ∗ PERIODt+β∗TY PEB+
∑
j=FS,NTQ,TQ
γj ∗ TREATj+uit (10)
12When the number of bids differs from the number of asks, the bidders or sellers not supplied are
determined randomly
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where c is a constant, PERIODt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for period t, t = 2, . . . , 7
(the benchmark being period 1), TY PEk is a dummy variable equal to 1 if subject i is of
type k (the benchmark type being TY PEA), and TREATj is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the player plays treatment k ∈ {FS,NTQ, TQ}, the treatment FA being the benchmark.
Based on a Hausman test13, we present the GLS estimation in Table 1.
Table 1: Nash deviation in absolute value
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
PERIOD2 -0.158
∗∗ (0.054)
PERIOD3 -0.318
∗∗ (0.054)
PERIOD4 -0.357
∗∗ (0.054)
PERIOD5 -0.436
∗∗ (0.054)
PERIOD6 -0.500
∗∗ (0.054)
PERIOD7 -0.469
∗∗ (0.054)
TY PEB -0.059 (0.061)
TREATFS -0.282
∗∗ (0.087)
TREATNTQ 0.300
∗∗ (0.087)
TREATTQ 0.695
∗∗ (0.087)
c 0.771∗∗ (0.077)
∗∗, ∗,†for respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.
First observe that, in addition to the treatment and the subject’s type, the coeffi-
cients associated with PERIODt are significant. Second, the coefficient associated with
PERIOD2 is significant and negative, which corresponds to a learning effect between peri-
ods 1 and 2. Third the coefficients α̂t are decreasing with t suggesting that the investment
strategy in the CPR gets closer to the Nash strategy period after period. Fourth, we reject
the null hypothesis α̂2 = α̂3 which also means also that the subjects’ strategies significantly
13We estimate three econometric models: an ordinary least squares model (OLS) based on the pooled
sample, a fixed (FE) and random effects (GLS) models. OLS is inconsistent if there are individual specific
effects. The GLS estimator is more efficient than the within estimator if the independent variables are
uncorrelated with the individual error term.
15
differ between periods 2 and 3. However, we always keep the null hypothesis α̂t = α̂t+1
for t ≥ 3: learning occurs mainly in period 1 to 3. We do not reject the null hypothesis
α̂7 = α̂6 = α̂5 which implies that the strategies are not significantly different for period 5,
6 and 7. In other words the impact of time is not statistically different for period 5 to 7.
This may be viewed as an indication of a good convergence of the subjects’ strategies.14
3.2 Resource preservation
We evaluate the performance of the four regimes (the free-access regime and the three
regulations) regarding resource preservation. We observe that free access leads to over-
investment in the CPR at a level close to the theoretical prediction. Although the Nash
equilibrium of X = 32 units is not reached, 75.7% of the subjects extract at full capacity,
making X = 28.6 units by averaging over periods.15 Under regulation, the investment
reduction by half is close to be reached on average. The Nash equilibrium predicts a
total investment in the CPR of 16 units under FS, TQ and NTQ. As expected, the two
market-based mechanisms FS and TQ implement the same extraction level as the NTQ
regulation. The average investments in CPR extraction over the seven periods (X = 15.26
under FS, X = 15.17 under TQ and X = 14.88 under NTQ) are not significantly different
according to the Wilcoxon-signed rank test (p ≥ 0.2840 for NTQ and FS, p ≥ 0.6646 for
NTQ and TQ and p ≥ 0.7268 for FS and TQ). Though close to the target level, the three
regulation means are significantly inferior to 16 according to a one-sample t-test. Whereas
regulations NTQ and TQ are designed so that the extraction target level cannot be passed
– subjects cannot extract more than 2 units in NTQ and a total of 16 permits are delivered
in TQ –, CPR extraction under FS exceeds the 16 units upper bound in 27.6% of cases.
FS also presents the highest variability in group extraction with a standard deviation of
4.18. This contrasts with the very low standard deviation in TQ in spite of its relatively
14Note however that the null hypothesis α̂4 = α̂5 = α̂6 = α̂7 is rejected at 1%.
15Subjects do not seek the social optimum which is obtained in our setup when the four players A extract
at their maximum capacity and when the four players B extract one unit each: fewer than 6% of players
B extract less than 2 units.
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higher complexity (σ = 0.60).
Figure 1: CPR extraction in the FS, NTQ and TQ16 treatments
3.3 Profits
We now examine the performance of the three regulations regarding individual welfare and
Pareto improvement compared to free access. The experiment was designed so that every
subject would experience a profit increase under regulation compared to free access in the
Nash equilibrium, this increase being higher and equivalent under the two market-based
regulations FS and TQ.
Profits are higher on average under regulations than under FA, and are higher under
the two market-based instruments FS and TQ than under TQ. Subjects earn in average
583.7 U, 583.4 U and 568.4 U per period respectively in treatments FS, TQ and NTQ;
compared with 557.5 U under FA. Consistently to theory, the profits under FS and TQ are
not significantly different (Wilcoxon p ≥ 0.3269). Profits in FA and NTQ are significantly
lower than profits in the two market-based instruments (p = 0.0000).
16The treatment FA is not included in the figure 1 because of scale effect.
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Yet higher average profits under regulations than under FA do not imply higher profits
for all subjects. Overall the Pareto dominance of regulations on free-access investment is
violated. We observe that profits are higher for all subjects compared to free access in only
71.1% of periods under TQ, 69% under FS and 60.0% under NTQ.17 This rate of Pareto
dominance goes down for type A players (the subjects with lower return outside the CPR)
to 53.3% under TQ, 51.1% under FS and 33.5% under NTQ, meaning that almost half
of type A players are worse-off under the two market-based regulations, and two-third are
under NTQ. Among all subjects, the average profit over the 7 periods is higher under TQ
than under FA for 72% of them, compared to 68 % under FS and 55% under NTQ. Over
the 7 periods, four subjects always obtain a lower profit under FS than under FA whereas
all subject gets more than under FA at least one period under TQ. This statistic suggests,
although Pareto-improvement from free-access is often violated, it holds more often and for
more subject under the two market-based instruments FS and TQ with a slight dominance
for TQ.
To further examine the impact of regulations on the Pareto-dominance condition, we
use the following econometric strategy. We first compute a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
profit for subject i at period t under a given regulation is greater than the profit obtained
in the same period by the same subject under the free-access treatment. We then estimate
a logit model to predict the probability of having a higher profit than under free access.
We control for the impact of the period, the subject type (A or B) and the treatment (FS,
TQ, NTQ). The results are presented in Table 2.18
Being a type B subject increases the probability of higher profits after regulation (the
marginal effect is equal to 0.43 and is significant at 1%) due to higher outside opportunity
. Compared to the NTQ treatment, FS and TQ have a positive and significant impact of
the probability of profit improvement (the marginal effects are respectively 0.09 and 0.12
and are significant at 1%). Moreover, we do not reject the null hypothesis of a different
17We compare the observed profit for period t under the regulation with the observed profit under FA
for the same period t and the same subject.
18We get a pseudo R2 equal to 0.2 which corresponds to a relatively poor predictive power of the logit
model. However, at a probability cutoff equal to 0.60, 73% of the subjects are well classified by the model.
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Table 2: Probability of profit improvement
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Marginal effect (Std. Err.)
PERIOD2 0.128 (0.168) 0.025 ( 0.033 )
PERIOD3 0.762
∗∗ (0.173) 0.135∗∗ ( 0.026 )
PERIOD4 0.490
∗∗ (0.170) 0.091∗∗ ( 0.029 )
PERIOD5 0.793
∗∗ (0.173) 0.140∗∗ ( 0.026 )
PERIOD6 0.904
∗∗ (0.175) 0.156∗∗ ( 0.025 )
PERIOD7 1.002
∗∗ (0.176) 0.169∗∗ ( 0.024 )
TY PEB 2.217
∗∗ (0.103) 0.429∗∗ ( 0.016 )
TREATFS 0.477
∗∗ (0.113) 0.093∗∗ ( 0.021 )
TREATTQ 0.611
∗∗ (0.115) 0.118∗∗ ( 0.021 )
Intercept -1.120∗∗ (0.144)
∗∗, ∗,†for respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Pseudo R2: 0.20
impact of FS and TQ on the probability of a profit improvement. Pareto dominance is
not significantly different under the two market-based instruments. Such results are in
line with the non-parametric tests: The percentage of higher profits are similar with the
two market-based instruments (Fisher p = 0.17) but not between the two market-based
instruments and NTQ (p = 1.240e− 4 for FS vs NTQ, p = 1.74e− 6 for TQ vs NTQ).19
3.4 Sorting Effect
We compare the performance of the two market-based instruments FS and TQ in screening
subject types. Since type B subjects have higher investment returns outside the CPR, only
type A subjects should invest all their units in the CPR. The market-based instruments
19Note that there is, once again, a form of learning effect between periods 1-2 (marginal effect not
significantly different from 0) and periods 3-7 (all marginal effects significantly different from 0). The
probabilities of profit improvement in periods 1 and 2 are not significantly different. The probability of
profit improvement however increases from period 3.
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FS and TQ differentiate individuals by encouraging type A subjects to invest all their
units in the CPR and type B none of them. Theoretically, FS and TQ perform equally
regarding this sorting effect. We argue that in the experiment FS performs better than
TQ.
We plot the percentage of subjects investing 0 to 4 units in the CPR four each types
in Figure 2 for the FS treatment and in Figure 3 for the TQ treatment.
Figure 2: Sorting effect -Investment in the CPR under FS
Figure 3: Sorting effect -Investment in the CPR under TQ
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The theoretical efficient sorting leads to extreme investment decisions: 100% type A
should invest their 4 units in the CPR and 100% of type B should invest 0 units in the
CPR. The above figures clearly make the point that more subjects choose intermediate
investment strategies (1, 2 or 3 units invested in the CPR, the rest being invested in
the outside option) under TQ than under FS. Under FS, most subjects choose extreme
investment strategies, although few of them choose the “wrong one”. Under TQ, more
subjects deviate from their Nash strategy but with only a few investment units. More
precisely, while 74.7% of type A and 83.3% of type B play Nash in FS, only 39.0% of type
A and 46.7% of type B play Nash in TQ (Fisher exact p = 0.0000 for types A and B).
Another measure of the sorting effect is the percentage investment from each type in
the CPR. Type A subjects represent 84.3% of total investment in the CPR under FS but
only 74.6% under TQ. Overall subjects of types A invest significantly more under FS (3.35
vs. 3.01 average units per capita, p ≤ 0.02966). On the other hand, type B subjects invest
significantly less (0.67 vs. 0.83, p ≤ 0.02930).
We provide further evidence of a better sorting with FS than with TQ by estimating
a model predicting the probability of playing the Nash strategy by each subject and each
period on the sub-sample defined by the treatments FS and TQ. We control with dummies
for the period, for the type and the treatment (TQ being the benchmark). The results are
summarized in Table 3 below.
We found that playing FS has a positive and significant impact on the probability of
playing Nash compared to TQ which is the benchmark in the estimation: the marginal
effect of the FS dummy is equal to 0.38 and is significant at 1%. This strengthens our
point that FS is more efficient than TQ in sorting types by making them play Nash more
often. Another interesting result is that type B subjects are more likely to play Nash than
type A, which means investing nothing in the CPR under both regulations. One reason
might be that playing Nash is more difficult under TQ for type A subjects since they need
to purchase 2 more units of quotas while type B subjects can simply not use their quotas.
We examine the impact of such market frictions in the next section.
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Table 3: Probability of playing Nash
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Marginal effect (Std. Err.)
PERIOD2 0.244 (0.194) 0.055 ( 0.043 )
PERIOD3 0.622
∗∗ (0.196) 0.134∗∗ ( 0.038 )
PERIOD4 0.738
∗∗ (0.196) 0.156∗∗ ( 0.037 )
PERIOD5 1.227
∗∗ (0.203) 0.240∗∗ ( 0.031 )
PERIOD6 1.359
∗∗ (0.205) 0.260∗∗ ( 0.030 )
PERIOD7 1.079
∗∗ (0.200) 0.216∗∗ ( 0.033 )
TY PEB 0.411
∗∗ (0.107) 0.095∗∗ ( 0.025 )
TREATFS 1.709
∗∗ (0.111) 0.379∗∗ ( 0.022 )
Intercept -1.267∗∗ (0.161)
∗∗, ∗,†for respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Pseudo R2: 0.14
3.5 Discussion
Maybe the most puzzling experimental result is that FS performs poorly in improving
subjects’ profit from free access despite a better sorting. Intuitively, we would expect
investment to be allocated more efficiently with a better sorting which should favor higher
profits and therefore more frequent Pareto improvement from free access. We do not
however observe that in the experiment. In this section we investigate why.
One explanation might be that the FS scheme induces a surplus which is not shared
by the subjects. In the experiments, the FS scheme might be unbalanced: subjects might
pay more through the fees than they receive in total through the subsidies. This imbalance
would create a surplus which would be taken out of the social welfare and therefore might
explain lower profits. In contrast, under TQ, the permit market clearing ensures that no
money is taken out of the economy. We found that, although the budget is in deficit on
average in the periods 1, 3, 4 and 7 and in surplus in the period 2, 5 and 6, it is balanced
on aggregate. Moreover, this deficit or surplus is marginal as it never goes beyond 4% of
the social welfare. Thus the budget surplus does not seem to be the reason for the lowest
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profits under FS.
We look more carefully at the deviations from Nash and its impacts of payoffs. As
mentioned before, subjects tend to deviate more often from their Nash strategy under TQ
than under FS: the deviation rate is overall 57% under TQ and significantly higher than
21% under FS (Fisher Exact, p = 0.0000). However Figures 2 and 3 clealry show that
when subjects deviate from Nash they tend to deviate more under FS than under TQ.
The lump-sum nature of FS provides incentives for extreme strategies: 4 or 0 units in the
CPR. Investing 1 to 4 units in the CPR costs the same price: 154U from tax plus 154U
from giving up the subsidy, which amounts to a 308U. As for TQ, the marginal cost for
extraction is 77U (i.e. the value of one permit). Almost all those who deviate under FS
choose the opposite strategy from Nash: investing all their units when Nash predicts no
investment and vice-versa). Under TQ many subjects deviate by not buying any trading
permits or only one, and thus invest 1, 2 or 3 units. They pay or give up only 1, 2 or 3
times 77U and not four times, i.e. 4× 77 = 308U like those who deviate from Nash under
FS.
The extreme deviation under FS clearly has an impact of profits. The high-power
incentive FS scheme improves sorting at the cost of a harsher punishment for those who
deviate. In order to asses the cost of deviating from Nash under both regulations, we
evaluate the relative average loss from Nash deviation in the following way. For each
regulation and type, we compute the average profit obtained by subjects playing Nash and
the average profit for those who deviate from the Nash strategy for the same period. We
then take the difference between the two terms, divided by the average profit for those who
play Nash. By taking the average over the 7 periods we obtain Table 4 below.
The relative profit loss of those who deviated from the Nash strategy is higher under
FS than under TQ for both types. The difference is greater for the B types: those who
invest in the CPR perform 15% less under FS than under TQ. For the FA types, those who
invest less than their 4 units in the CPR enjoy 15.2% less profits under FS and 8.1% less
under TQ. This highest loss from Nash deviation has an impact on the Pareto-dominance
condition. Even if the CPR extraction is on average sufficiently preserved to allow for
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Table 4: Relative profit loss from Nash deviation
Treatment A B Total
FA -12.6% -4.4% -8.4%
FS -15.2% -14.7% -15.0%
TQ -8.10% -2.9% -5.5%
NTQ -23.2% -14.0% -18.6%
a profit improvement, some subjects experience a reduction of profits with regulations
because they deviate from the Nash strategy. We find evidence that deviating from Nash
is more likely to reduce profits from free access under all regulations. By comparing the
profit of those who play Nash under free access and deviate from Nash under regulation
during the same period, we obtain a percentage of lower profits under regulation: 91% for
NTQ, 85% under FS, and 45% under TQ. In contrast, if we consider those who play Nash
in the same period, the percentage of lower profits under regulation goes down to 41% for
NTQ, 25% for FS and 18% for TQ. Those who are the more likely to lose from regulation
are the type A players whose return outside the CPR is the lowest. It turns out that the
inequality among types measured as the difference between type A and type B average
profits, is higher under FS (68.7 on average) than under TQ (59.5, Wilcoxon, p ≥ 0.0829).
This distributional impact of the FS regulation in favor the richer subject (defined as those
with higher outside opportunities) is detrimental to its acceptability (defined as profit
improvement from free access). It thus seems that FS is provide more incentives but hurt
more less subjects than TQ.
We lastly examine in more detail the reason for a higher rate of Nash deviation and
therefore poor sorting under TQ. First, we observe that subjects do not make a mistake by
buying or not selling permits they don’t use. Once the bids and asks are allocated, only
4.4% of the subjects do not use their permit(s). The non-use of permits is therefore not
a cause of deviation. Second, subjects might fail to invest all their units, or may invest
nothing at all, because of market frictions. As we have imposed market clearing at an
exogenous price for the TQ regulation, there might be some imbalance between asks and
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bids and therefore some rationing. On the other hand, we do not force the FS scheme to
be budget balanced.
To asses the performance of TQ without rationing we compute the experimental results
as if all wishes were fulfilled. We simulate a regulation in which permit wishes (asks and
demands) in TQ are regarded as actual investment. In such a configuration, permits act as
a proportional fee/subsidy scheme. Buying one 77U permit in order to extract one more
unit is equivalent to paying a 77U tax for extracting one more unit. Market frictions are
removed as the regulator bears the imbalance between buys and sells (or tax and subsidy)
although the cost of deviation is similar to TQ.
Unsurprisingly, using trade wishes as investment decisions lowers the deviation rate
from 57% to 39% (p = 0.0000). Yet it remains significantly more important than the 21%
deviation rate under FS (p = 0.0001). Removing market friction does not significantly
improve sorting: type A’s investment share increased from 74.6% to 75.9% which is still
lower than the 84% share under FS. Overall profits are not improved (581.8U in average
compared to 583.7U in FS and 583.4U in TQ) and the aggregated investment in the CPR
exceeds the 16 units targeted by the regulation. Lastly, using permit trade wishes as in-
vestment decisions does not improve Pareto dominance: 66.2% of the decisions improve
profits from free access, compared with 71.1% under TQ and 69.0% under FS. These sim-
ulation suggests markets frictions are not the main explanation for TQ under-performance
in sorting. It is mostly due to the payment scheme which is per-unit under TQ (77U per
investment) rather than fixed under FS (4× 77 = 308U which is the sum of the fix fee and
the subsidy). As a consequence, it therefore exhibits less power incentives.
4 Conclusion
In this paper our aim was to compare the performance of three different instruments de-
signed to reduce overuse in common pool resources, namely: two market-based instruments
- a price based one, fees and subsidies, and a rights-based one transferable quotas -, as well
as a command-and-control instrument - non transferable quotas scheme. We designed a
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static theoretical model of extraction of a resource, with a population of agents with con-
stant but heterogeneous opportunity marginal extraction costs (low and high). Apart from
the classical analysis in terms of welfare, this model imposes a Pareto-improving condition
for the instruments to be acceptable by users. The comparison is based on theoretical
prediction and an experiment in which each subject is exposed to all the instruments, with
the free-access regime as a benchmark.
We find that, consistently with theory, all instruments perform equally in preserving the
resource on average. Yet the variance is lower under quotas because extraction is bounded
upward. In contrast the extraction rate targeted by the regulation is often exceeded under
the fee and subsidy scheme. The two market-based instruments succeed in screening the
subjects with higher opportunity cost of resource extraction. This makes these instruments
more profitable than non-transferable quotas on average and also for more subjects: those
who experience a Pareto-improvement from free access are more numerous. Yet, in contrast
to the Nash equilibrium predictions, some of the subject are worse off than under the free
access regime even with the two market-based instruments.
Interestingly, the two market-based instruments, which are equivalent in theory, perform
differently regarding sorting and Pareto improvement from free access. We found that
the fee and subsidy scheme scores better in sorting out the high-cost types but leads
to slightly fewer Pareto improvements from free-access than transferable quotas. The
lump-sum nature of the access fee and subsidy for not investing in the resource provides
high-power incentives for extreme investment strategies (investing all the endowment or
nothing in the common-pool resource), which definitively favors sorting. Yet the subjects
are more hurt if they make “mistakes” by not playing Nash, which means not using the
extreme strategy or, more often, using the “wrong” extreme strategy. This is why this
better sorting does not translate into higher profits for more subjects. Under transferable
quotas, subjects are charged only a marginal over-cost of extraction through the cost of
purchasing quotas. They might not found a buyer or a seller for their quota. Consequently
they more often invest few units (one to three) in the common-pool resource which is a
smaller deviation from Nash. Although they generally incur a loss of profit from this Nash
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deviation, it is also limited because the extraction rate is bounded upward by quotas.
Our experiment sheds light on the choice of instruments for common-pool regulation.
It confirms the dominance of market-based regulations over nontransferable and uniform
quotas for efficiency and individual welfare. It also makes the distinction between market-
based instruments relying on price or quantity. We provide experimental evidence that
high-power incentive price schemes can be very costly for users, thereby questioning their
political feasibility. Even if they sort out the less efficient users better than tradable
extraction quotas, those who do not respond properly to incentives pay a higher cost.
Moreover, total extraction is not bounded upwards by quotas which reinforce the profit loss
in case of deviation. This trade-off between high power incentives and political feasibility
which is not an issue in theory arises in our experiment. It might matter in practice.
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APPENDIX
A Treatments order
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Session 1 NTQ FA FS TQ
Session 2 FS TQ NTQ FA
Session 3 FA FS TQ NTQ
Session 4 TQ NTQ FA FS
Session 5 NTQ TQ FA FS
Session 6 FS FA TQ NTQ
Session 7 FA NTQ FS TQ
Session 8 TQ FS NTQ FA
B Experimental Protocol
B.1 Introduction read to subjects by experiment monitor
Good evening. Can I have your attention please. This is an experiment in decision making
in economics. The instructions are simple. All profits you make during the experiment will
be totalled and paid to you in privacy in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount
paid depends on decisions making during the experiment. The experiment will last 2 hours.
As you see, you are 16 participants at this experiment. To guarantee anonymity, each
participant is identified by a code number. During experiment, it is forbidden to commu-
nicate in any way with other participants. Keep concentrate on your own computer screen
and keep silent during the whole experiment. If you have any problems feel free to raise
your hand and one of the experiment monitors will assist you.
You will be able to read all the instructions on your own computer screen.
The money of the experiment is the Yen. The exchange rate of the experiment is 100
Yen=0.1661 Euro.
You can now press the button -START-
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B.2 Instructions on screen
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in decision making in economics.
At the beginning of the experiment, two groups of 8 individuals are created. The
composition of these two groups will remain the same during the whole experiment. The
two groups will work independently.
Page break
Each of you is the producer of a good on market “gamma” and of a good on market
“delta”. You are endowed in production units that you must distribute on these two mar-
kets. More precisely, you will decide a production level on market gamma. The production
units non utilized will be automatically assigned to market delta.
On market gamma, the production generates a gain. The gain increases with the
number of individual production units and decreases with the units produced by all of the
producers of the group.
On market delta, the production also generates a gain. The gain increases with the
number of production units. It is independent of the units produced by all of the producers
of the group.
Page break
There are two types of producers, A and B. This type was assigned randomly and
permanently to each individual for the whole experiment. On market delta, the production
per unit is more profitable for producer B.
Page break
The experiment comprises four distinct treatments which will be run successively. Each
treatment consists on a succession of 7 periods. At each period, you will decide the number
of units you will produce on market gamma. The remaining units will be intended to market
delta. At the end of each period, you will set the following information:
- Total production of the group on market gamma
- Your own total gain in the two markets.
Page break
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In order to help your decision making, you will set for each treatment a table of possible
gains function of the production units repartition on the two markets and of the total pro-
duction level of the group on market gamma. The table indicates the total gain generated
by the two markets (gamma and delta).
Page break
The production rules differ at each treatment. These rules will be announced at the
beginning of each new treatment.
Page break
TREATMENT FA
Your production capacity and the one of the other producers is fixed to 4 units. At
each period, we will decide the number of production units (x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) on market
gamma. The total production level (X) is the sum of production units in the group on
market gamma. Here, X is comprised between 0, and 4× 8 = 32.
The number of production units on market delta is the difference between production
capacity and the number of units decided on market gamma (4− x).
Page break
In each group, there is 4 producers A and 4 producers B. On market gamma, the two
types of producers have a unitary production gain of (230 − 3X) yen . On market delta,
producers A have a unitary production gain of 90 yen and producers B have a unitary
production gain of 120 yen .
Page break You are producer A/B, your unitary gain on market delta is thus:...
The gain of your activity on market gamma :
- increases with your individual production level (x)
- decreases with total production level of your group (X).
The gain of your activity on market delta :
- increases with production units non assigned on market gamma (4− x).
Page break
For each individual, total gain is calculated as follows:
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Producer A : (230− 3X)× x︸ ︷︷ ︸ + 90(4− x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gains on market gamma gains on market delta
Producer B :(230− 3X)× x︸ ︷︷ ︸ + 120(4− x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gains on market gamma gains on market delta
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Payoff matrix of player type A – Treatment FA.
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Payoff matrix of player type B – Treatment FA.
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